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ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Toward a Phenomenological Account of Embodied
Subjectivity in Autism
Sofie Boldsen1
 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2018
Abstract Sensorimotor research is currently challenging the dominant understanding
of autism as a deficit in the cognitive ability to ‘mindread’. Thismarks an emerging shift
in autism research from a focus on the structure and processes of the mind to a focus on
autistic behavior as grounded in the body. Contemporary researchers in sensorimotor
differences in autism call for a reconciliation between the scientific understanding of
autism and the first-person experience of autistic individuals. I argue that fulfilling this
ambition requires a phenomenological understanding of the body as it presents itself in
ordinary experience, namely as the subject of experience rather than a physical object.
On this basis, I investigate how the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty can be
employed as a frame of understanding for bodily experience in autism. Through a
phenomenological analysis of TitoMukhopadhyay’s autobiographical work, How can I
talk if my lips don’t move (2009), I illustrate the relevance and potential of phe-
nomenological philosophy in autism research, arguing that this approach enables a
deeper understanding of bodily and subjective experiences related to autism.
Keywords Autism  Phenomenology  Embodied subjectivity  Movement 
Perception  Self-experience
Introduction
‘Theory of mind’ and its equivalents ‘mindreading’ and ‘mentalizing’ have since the
1980’s played a leading role in discussions of social understanding in psychology
and philosophy of mind, and has rightly earned the label ‘paradigm’ in autism
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research. When Simon Baron-Cohen, Alan Leslie and Uta Frith (1985) proposed the
idea that autistic children lack the ability to ‘mindread,’ autism became established
as a disorder of the higher-order cognitive abilities. In recent years, this picture has
changed as cognitive scientists recognize that cognition must be understood in its
dynamic relation to bodily movement, perceptual processes and social interaction
(Glenberg, Witt, and Metcalfe 2013). In the context of autism research, this shift in
view is represented in a growing body of research investigating how sensorimotor
differences might underlie what we know as autistic behavior (Leary and Hill 1996;
Brincker and Torres 2013; De Jaegher 2013; Donnellan, Hill, and Leary 2012;
Robledo, Donnellan, and Strandt-Conroy 2012; Whyatt and Craig 2013). The
‘sensorimotor perspective’ on autism is a diverse movement gathering various
disciplines such as neuroscience, developmental psychology, action-perception
research, and philosophy, in order to reconceptualize autism in terms of movement
and sensation.
By drawing on previous work that explores the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty in-
depth as a conceptual frame in autism research (Boldsen 2016), this article discusses
how phenomenology enables an understanding of the experiential dimension of
sensorimotor differences in autism. The analyses and discussions in this article will
therefore be relevant to several audiences, including autism researchers interested in
the lived experiences of autistic individuals and philosophers interested in the
application of phenomenology.
Exploring Autistic Embodiment and Experience
Autistic individuals have long been known to move in ways that are at times
puzzling and seemingly meaningless: endless rocking back and forth, flicking of
fingers, odd hand postures, repeatedly touching certain objects, stimming or unusual
gait and body posture. In their groundbreaking article, Martha Leary and David Hill
(1996) point out how autistic behavior is usually interpreted as a lack of interest in
participating in social or communicative activities and suggest that autistic
behaviors should be understood in light of sensorimotor differences. The concept
of behavior involved in this research emphasizes how our actions and interactions
are made possible by our ability to sense our own movements and regulate the
motions of our body in line with this sensory feedback. In this way, behavior is
highly dependent upon the interaction between sensory and motor systems, which
may be different in autism (Donnellan, Hill, and Leary 2012). Most authors
investigating sensorimotor differences in autism suggest methods of objectively
measuring and quantifying the interaction between neurological processes, sensory
systems and microscopic movement:
Movement is measurable. Its quantification can bring the science of autism to a
higher, more rigorous standard that is lacking today. […] We would at last be
able to follow the true scientific method, and avoid jeopardizing the future of
ASD kids and adults with mere guesses and non-scientific controversies that
have not been supported by rigorous research. (Torres and Donnellan 2015:1-2)
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The ambition is to avoid reliance on observation of autistic behaviors, which may
too easily invite misinterpretations of these behaviors as expressions of social
impairment (Leary and Hill 1996). Taken together, the various approaches to
sensorimotor problems in autism represent a view that strongly objects to the
dominant and cognitively driven explanations of autism1 (Brincker and Torres
2013; Whyatt and Craig 2013).
Elizabeth Torres and Anne Donnellan (2015) argue that autism research should
include and accommodate the experiences and perspectives of autistic individuals.
This view reflects a growing interest in the narratives and experiences of people
diagnosed with autism that began to flourish around the 1990’s (Hacking 2009).
Within some areas of autism research, scholars have begun to include autistics as an
active part of the research process, for example through participatory research
methods (Milton and Moon 2012; Pellicano, Dinsmore, and Charman 2013).
Furthermore, a number of autistic individuals are themselves becoming autism
researchers (Milton 2014a; Arnold 2012; Murray, Lesser, and Lawson 2005; Kapp
2013; Nolan and McBride 2015). The emergence of self-advocacy networks and the
fact that autistic individuals are participating actively in the processes of knowledge
production reflects an emerging shift in the distribution of power in autism research
(Graby 2012; Milton, Mills, and Pellicano 2012). Authors within the area of
sensorimotor research on autism aim to accommodate and embrace this develop-
ment. As Jodi Robledo, Anne Donnellan and Karen Strandt-Conroy state:
If we wish to truly understand the experience of sensory and movement
differences for individuals with autism, we must explore their experiences and
perspectives. […] [I]n studying autism we need to elicit information from one
of the most valuable resources—people with the label of autism. (Robledo,
Donnellan, and Strandt-Conroy 2012:1-2)
The emergence of the sensorimotor perspective on autism and growing interest in
autistic experiences poses an important question: how does the subjective
experience of autistic individuals relate to the measurable physiological motions
arguably underlying natural behavior? This calls for a theoretical and methodolog-
ical framework that bridges the gap between subjective experience and the physical
processes of the body. One possible approach is to integrate relevant phenomeno-
logical analyses of embodied subjectivity. From a phenomenological perspective,
the body is intrinsically connected with subjectivity and shapes the way we
experience the world, each other, and ourselves. On this basis, I argue that
phenomenology provides an adequate framework for addressing the experiential
dimension of sensorimotor differences in autism. The philosophical tradition of
phenomenology provides perspectives on themes that are deeply interesting to the
field of psychology, such as subjectivity, intersubjectivity, affectivity, and
embodiment. Even though phenomenology over the past 100 years has become a
diverse field, a common trait between the different approaches is the attempt to
uncover and examine how the world is experienced prior to conscious thought,




conceptual knowledge and linguistic communication. In other words, phenomenol-
ogy aims to describe a level of awareness of the world, oneself and others that is
pre-reflective.Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2012), a classical proponent of phenomenol-
ogy, famously states that the ways in which we encounter the world consciously,
conceptually or scientifically presuppose and are shaped by immediate and pre-
reflective bodily experience.
Merleau-Ponty and Embodied Subjectivity
Unlike his phenomenological predecessors, Merleau-Ponty made the body the
center of his philosophy, and throughout his writing, he emphasized its constitutive
role in subjective experience. Within a phenomenological framework, the experi-
ence of sensorimotor processes refers to a very basic form of self-awareness: a pre-
reflective experience of oneself as a sensing and moving body that implicitly
structures one’s conscious and thematic experiences of the world. In Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology, this means that in any experience, we are always implicitly
aware of ourselves as sensing and moving bodies, and ultimately, that the body is
the subject of experience.
In his main philosophical work Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty
shows how experience and knowledge of the world does not originate in reflective
consciousness, but rather in our bodily engagement with the world. This insight
marks the way Merleau-Ponty (2012:139) extends and redefines the classical
phenomenological notion of intentionality as being solidly grounded in the body.
What renders the world meaningful in experience is not the way I can think about its
objects or make judgments about them, neither is it the way my body as a bundle of
physical processes is designed to sense it. Rather, the world presents itself as
meaningful by virtue of my body’s perceptual engagement in it. Merleau-Ponty
understands perception to be a certain form of bodily being-in-the-world rather than
a passive process, where the world is merely represented through the medium of the
sensory system. For Merleau-Ponty, perception is an active process where the
subject involves itself bodily in the world, and is thereby shaped by the movements
of the body. Movement is not merely the changing of the body’s position in space,
but the unfolding of a perspective on the world. In movement, I recognize the world
as a field of possible actions as I reach out and engage with the objects in my
perceptual surroundings. Through movement, I actively join with the world, express
my projects and my points of view.
Returning to the topic of autism and sensorimotor problems, some important
differences emerge between a phenomenological approach and the perspective
offered by sensorimotor research. In the framework of Merleau-Ponty’s phe-
nomenology, it would only provide one piece of the puzzle to measure and quantify
movement and sensation. In order to fully understand sensorimotor problems, it is
necessary to approach bodily issues as subjective in nature and understand how they
shape and affect the individual’s way of experiencing and engaging with the world.
Within a phenomenological framework, the body cannot be understood as a purely
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physical system, and therefore, we must turn our attention to the body as the subject
rather than the object of experience.
In recent years, a number of articles have emerged that use phenomenology as a
methodological and theoretical framework for understanding autism (Huws and
Jones 2015; Zukauskas, Silton, and Assumpção 2009; Williams 2004; Newman,
Cashin, and Waters 2010; Zahavi and Parnas 2003). Furthermore, some articles and
conference papers address different aspects of autism from the perspective of
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology (Zahavi 2005; He and Jespersen 2015; Dant 2015;
Stawarska 2006; Rasmussen, unpub.; Kristensen 2012). These articles and
manuscripts address highly relevant themes to autism research, such as learning,
social cognition, play and communication. However, with the exception of Dan
Zahavi’s analysis of bodily self-awareness in autism, none of the authors tackle the
experiential dimension of sensorimotor processes directly. Although Zahavi’s work
do engage with the empirical discipline of developmental psychology, his work
remains theoretical in ambition. In this way, the aim of this article differs from that
of Zahavi’s in that the relevance of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology is assessed by
its potential of making sense of concrete experiences described by autistic
individuals.
Autistic Autobiography and the Case of Tito Rajarshi Mukhopadhyay
One way to understand how bodily processes of movement and perception shape
subjective experience in autism is to delve into the flourishing field of autism
autobiography. Since the publication of David Eastham’s Understand: Fifty
memowriter poems (1985), autism narratives has become a steadily growing genre
(Rose 2005; Bates 2010). Among many others, notable publications are Temple
Grandin’s Thinking in Pictures (2006), Donna Williams’ Nobody nowhere (1992)
and Liane Holliday Willey’s Pretending to be normal: Living with Asperger’s
Syndrome (1999). In this article, I will focus on Tito Rajarshi Mukhopadhyay’s How
can I talk if my lips don’t move (2011). A phenomenological analysis would ideally
address several first-person accounts, but I have chosen to present an in-depth
analysis of a single narrative in order to demonstrate the potential of phenomenol-
ogy in understanding embodied subjectivity in autism.
Tito Mukhopadhyay was born in India in 1989 and was diagnosed with severe
autism in early childhood. Although Tito has been practically non-verbal throughout
his life, his mother Soma taught him to read and write at an early age. Shortly after
BBC made the documentary Tito’s Story (Terrill and Lichtenstein 2000), Tito and
his mother were brought to the United States in 2001 on a sponsorship from Cure
Autism Now (now merged with Autism Speaks). As will be discussed further below,
there are several controversies surrounding Tito Mukhopadhyay and the Rapid
Prompting Method, one of them being the issue of physical abuse. Mukhopadhyay
himself describes how his mother was ‘firm’ with him as part of his training:
[S]he became my teacher. A very firm teacher who would not give me the next
meal unless I used the pencil in the proper way. And because I was constantly
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dropping the pencil down she tied it to my hands with a rubber band. And
when I was not completing the questions which she had given me after reading
a chapter, I was tied down to the chair till I finished it. (Mukhopadhyay in
Biklen et al. 2005:128)
Before going further into the phenomenological analysis of Mukhopadhyay’s work,
I want to state unequivocally that the use of Mukhopadhyay’s descriptions in this
article should not be regarded as an acknowledgement of the methods of Soma’s
training. I take Mukhopadhyay’s work as a point of departure for the present
analysis of embodied subjectivity in autism because his autobiographical account
provides unique descriptions of autistic experience. At the heart of these
descriptions, making them all the more interesting for the purpose of this article,
lie issues centered on bodily self-experience, sensation, movement and perception.
Besides describing problems that have long been recognized as fairly general for the
autism spectrum, Mukhopadhyay expresses an aspect of these problems that is
rarely known to non-autistic individuals. Namely, what meaning and sense are
encountered in autistic symptoms from a first-person perspective.
As mentioned above, Tito has learned to write through the Rapid Prompting
Method developed by his mother. Soma’s method is similar to Facilitated
Communication (FC) where communication by pointing, typing or writing is
physically supported by a facilitator (Crossley 1992; Biklen 1990). In the Rapid
Prompting Method, as the name suggests, communication relies on eliciting
responses from the participant through the facilitator’s use of physical, verbal, or
auditory prompts. Critics of the Rapid Prompting Method and other forms of FC
argue that these methods do not facilitate independent communication (Lang et al.
2014) and that the elicited responses from the participant are highly susceptible to
facilitator influence (Schlosser et al. 2014). One could argue that this criticism
provides ground for questioning the autonomy of Tito Mukhopadhyay’s voice and
the identification of his autobiography as a first-person account of autism.
Notwithstanding, different forms of FC have also been celebrated in self-advocacy
networks and the neurodiversity movement for providing opportunities for non-
verbal individuals with autism to communicate ‘‘[…] ideas about their lives and
their relationship to the world. ‘‘(Biklen et al. 2005:1). When reading the analysis of
Mukhopadhyay’s autobiographical account, I urge the reader to keep this
controversy in mind and form his or her own opinion. However, there seems to
be a danger looming in completely rejecting different forms of FC as a valid way of
communicating in potentially discrediting the perspectives of individuals with
severe autism.
Another caution when reading autistic autobiographies is voiced by Ian Hacking
(2009). Mukhopadhyay’s autobiographical work has by Portia Iversen been termed
‘‘a window into autism such as the world has never seen’’ (Iversen in Blakeslee
2002). This increasingly popular way of introducing autism narratives as a view
‘inside the autistic mind’ must, according to Hacking (2009), be regarded with some
suspicion. Individuals with autism are as different from each other as ‘neurotypical’
people are. In other words, there is no ‘the’ autistic mind. For this reason, I will not
argue that the points raised in the following analysis of Mukhopadhyay’s work are
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representative of a general way of experiencing that can be termed autistic. Rather,
Hacking (2009) is urging us to understand autistic narratives as creating new ways
of describing the intentions, thoughts and feelings of autistic individuals underlying
the (to people that are not autistic) sometimes rather baffling behavior. Although
Hacking’s point that autism narratives cannot be regarded as direct descriptions of
what it is like to be autistic is important and convincing, I argue that it is nonetheless
of paramount importance to develop a framework for understanding first-person
experience in autism. I argue this, not only on the ground that autism research ought
to take seriously the experience of autistic individuals, but also because developing
structured approaches to subjective experience is essential in order to understand
individuality and heterogeneity across the spectrum.
Mukhopadhyay’s work has important value as the object of phenomenological
analysis. Philosophical phenomenology has shown to be a fruitful frame of
understanding in both psychology and psychopathology. This is most lately
illustrated in schizophrenia research, where prominent psychiatrists and phenome-
nologists collaborate in the understanding of disturbances of pre-reflective self-
experience in the early stages of schizophrenia (Sass and Parnas 2003; Parnas et al.
2005). Regrettably, a comprehensive phenomenological account of autism has yet to
be developed. The following analysis provides an example of how it is possible to
engage phenomenological analyses with the field of autism research in order to
understand the bodily and subjective experience of autistic individuals.
Bodily Self-Experience and Self-Estrangement
Bodily self-experience can be described, not as a conscious or explicit view of the
body as if looking in a mirror, but as a tacit and pre-reflective awareness of one’s
own body accompanying any action, perception or thought. A central point in
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology is that the body does not primarily present itself to
me as an object of experience. Although I can turn my attention toward my body
and encounter it as if it were a constellation of individual parts, what really
constitutes its being a body for me is its infatuation with subjectivity and life and the
fact that it is always experienced as my own. In this way, the body cannot be
understood as a complex constellation of parts; it presents itself rather as an
undivided, although implicit, unity (Merleau-Ponty 2012:102). When I stretch
myself to reach for a cup of coffee, I am not conscious of the complex interplay of
movements between individual parts of my body necessary to perform this action.
Rather, I direct the whole of my body toward a goal—retrieving the cup—being
only implicitly aware of the fluency of the body’s whole movement towards this
goal.
During his childhood, Mukhopadhyay relied heavily on performing certain
movements and actions in order to feel at ease with his body. In this case, he
describes how he used the movements of the ceiling fan in his childhood home to
maintain bodily feeling of ease and control:
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I would stand right below it, and rotate my body as fast as I could, wondering
whether I too became as transparent as the fan. […] I could gather my body
parts while I rotated, so that I could feel my arms, legs, and fingers, in total
control. […] Once again, I felt sure of my movements and what I was
supposed to see as I went around at that speed. Feeling sure calmed my senses.
(Mukhopadhyay 2011:59-60)
The movements of the fan and the simultaneous movements of his own body seem
to relieve him of a certain bodily feeling he describes encountering whenever the
frequent power cuts stopped the fan from moving: ‘‘When there were power cuts, I
felt helpless and scattered once again, as if my existence depended on the
movements of the fan.’’ (Mukhopadhyay 2011:63). ‘Gathering’ the parts of the body
is ultimately what relieves Mukhopadhyay of this feeling of being scattered or
disassembled. Gathering the parts of the body by spinning with the fan is
understandable within the framework of Merleau-Ponty as a way to uphold a very
basic sense of bodily self. Conversely, Mukhopadhyay’s experience of being left
with a fragmented body consisting of scattered parts points to a form of bodily self-
estrangement. Experiencing the body as a bundle of disconnected parts is essentially
an objectification where the body, rather than being an experiencing subject, is
experienced as if it were an object in the physical world.
A more vivid description of self-estrangement that is closely related to the one
described above can be found in Mukhopadhyay’s memory of going to the doctor as
a child. As discussed above, Mukhopadhyay’s wellbeing was highly dependent on
performing certain movements and actions, one being to climb up and down
staircases.
I was puzzled. Mother had never stopped me from climbing any staircase
before. […] And when I got puzzled, I got disoriented. And when I got
disoriented, I got scared. I felt as if my whole existence depended on those
staircases. ‘What if I stop existing when I stop climbing them?’ Panic took
over my eyes, blinding them shut. It took over my ears, deafening me with the
sound of a scream, which was my own, as I recognized it. […] My body and
my surroundings were dissolved in the sound generated by my scream. Once it
took control, I knew no one had any power to stop it. I had no power to stop it
either. (Mukhopadhyay 2011:40-41)
What emerges here is a panic so intense that Mukhopadhyay loses touch with
himself. To stop moving up and down the stairs means to stop existing, to lose the
feeling of certainty and ease which the movement granted him. In his panic, he
disconnects with himself in the sense that he loses the experience of ownership over
his own body and is left with a scream that has become a mere auditory object,
originating elsewhere and only recognized as his own as he hears the sound.
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Movement and Motor Significance
In the following excerpt, Mukhopadhyay describes how he is unable to execute the
movements necessary to perform certain actions, in this case going to the adjourning
room and retrieving his pen and notebook. As we shall see, his description reflects
important aspects of bodily movement as understood by Merleau-Ponty.
My plan to write a few lines remained a mere plan because I could not get the
mental map required to actually do anything beyond sitting where I was, or to
implement my plan. My pencil and my notebook were in the next room, and I
could not map my body to go and bring them, although I could very well
visualize the process of opening a page and writing. (Mukhopadhyay
2011:126)
Viewed through the lens of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, what Mukhopadhyay
is struggling with, is granting the thought of writing in his notebook an actual,
bodily and motor significance. When Mukhopadhyay sees the pen in front of him,
he can grab it without difficulty. But when the notebook is not positioned in the
immediate vicinity, the object remains a mere thought severed from its concrete
environment. Merleau-Ponty (2012:114) distinguishes between two aspects of
movement: concrete movement as a practical handling of the world where the body
adheres and responds to the immediate environment, and abstract movement that
‘‘sets up its own background.’’ This latter aspect of movement consists in granting a
bodily and motor signification to the world in which concrete movement unfolds.
The world as it presents itself to us is not a mere constellation of physical objects
positioned in space, but always already embedded with meaning and significations
reflecting and inviting the projects and goals of the embodied subject. The subject is
always directed toward the world, and conversely, the world is always inciting
certain bodily attitudes, movements and actions. On this backdrop, Mukhopad-
hyay’s difficulty with retrieving his pen and notebook can be understood as a
difficulty with recognizing a bodily, motor significance to the desired objects.
Consequently, they do not invite him to move his body in the required way; he
cannot ‘map’ his body correctly.
Let us consider this notion of mapping, a term Mukhopadhyay uses repeatedly to
describe his way of handling certain situations. He describes this process as ‘‘a
mental picture I form, which I expect to face in the process of events […].’’
(Mukhopadhyay 2011:191). Particularly necessary in stressful, confusing or
otherwise overwhelming situations, mental maps function as ways of coping with
the world by mapping out meticulously the position and movements of the body, the
course of action and the corresponding position of the objects involved. In the
following passage, Mukhopadhyay describes the role of mental maps when
acquiring new practical skills, in this case, buttoning a shirt:
To button my shirt, I used only one hand at first. I could not use two hands in
two different ways. Buttoning needs two hands working in two different ways,
each hand supporting the other in a cooperative effort. […] Once I understood
the task, I could map it well around my body. Every successive try got this
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kind of mapping well established in my mind. […] And I began to map out the
buttons, not just like a visually impaired person, as I previously did.
(Mukhopadhyay 2011:74-75)
The way Mukhopadhyay gradually maps out the relation between his two hands
working together, the shirt, its sleeves and buttons is a form of awareness of the
body in relation to the object of its activity. For Merleau-Ponty, bodily self-
awareness is not a mere mental picture of the body isolated from its current
environment and task, but rather a pre-reflective experience of the body as engaged
in the world at hand. When the body immerses itself in the world, it involves a tacit
self-awareness that may best be described in terms of a familiarity or intuitive feel
of the movements of the body as it engages in a certain task. Mukhopadhyay’s
description of learning how to button his shirt indicates in its own way a break with
this bodily familiarity with the world. It is worth bringing forth Merleau-Ponty’s
own description of the type of bodily understanding involved in our practical
engagement with the world:
It is a question of a knowledge in our hands, which is only given through a
bodily effort and cannot be translated by an objective designation. The subject
knows where the letters are on the keyboard just as we know where one of our
limbs is – a knowledge of familiarity that does not provide us with a position
in objective space. (Merleau-Ponty 2012:145)
According to Merleau-Ponty, this intimate relationship between body and world
cannot be captured by reference to conceptual or reflective knowledge. Yet,
Mukhopadhyay’s mental mapping, a highly reflective activity, seems to be exactly
what establishes the crucial connection between body and world. Merleau-Ponty
argues that the reflective, mental activity, that Mukhopadhyay relies on in order to
act, is presupposed by a pre-reflective awareness of the body in its engagement with
its surroundings. It seems reasonable to consider whether Mukhopadhyay’s
dependence on mental maps is a way of coping with a diminished pre-reflective
bodily self-awareness. Mukhopadhyay’s difficulty with making his two hands work
together (as though initially disconnected from each other) bears a certain likeness
to his description of gathering his body parts under the spinning fan. It seems as
though these situations might share a common core, namely the feeling of
detachment from one’s own body as a silent background for action.
Sensory Experience
In the following section, we will look at the body as a sensory being, more precisely
at the experience of the body sensing the world and the experience of the body
sensing itself. Mukhopadhyay describes how his tactile hypersensitivity affects the
process of learning how to write:
[…] due to my selective tactile defenses, holding a new object was a real pain.
[…] My senses were strained by practicing holding the pencil, resulting in
discomfort, the kind you feel when the hair of your legs are stroked in opposite
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direction of their growth. It was like wearing a new pair of shoes.
(Mukhopadhyay 2011:158-159)
Holding the pencil overstimulates Mukhopadhyay’s tactile sense to such a degree
that it becomes impossible for him to hold on it. He compares the sensation to
wearing a new pair of shoes:
New shoes made my feet look detached from the rest of me. My senses got so
strained that I refused to lay my feet on the ground. […] And I remember it
through the intensity of that experience, which accumulated my senses, all at
once, merging together with banging stress. (Mukhopadhyay 2011:85)
Notably, Mukhopadhyay’s memory of the tactile experience of the new shoes
relates to a feeling of the feet as detached from the rest of the body. When
overstimulated by the new leather shoes, the feet announce themselves as objects of
awareness. Merleau-Ponty (2012:103) describes bodily space as ‘‘the darkness
needed in the theater required for the clarity of the performance’’ and ‘‘the zone of
non-being in front of which precise being, figures, and points can appear.’’ In other
words, when we experience the world the body is the experiential null-point, from
which we experience, and not an object of experience itself. In the situation
described by Mukhopadhyay, the feet demand his attention to them as objects of
experience and refuse to reside into the anonymity of the body as the background of
experience.
On one hand, Mukhopadhyay’s sense experience reveals the body as an object of
attention rather than being identical with himself as a subject living and acting in the
world. On the other hand, we find in Mukhopadhyay’s descriptions a body that has
vanished from the field of experience, emphasizing instead a radically diminished
bodily self-awareness:
To learn the sensation of physical pain, I had to mentally experience it. My
mind needed to judge the location of the pain, the structure of the pain, and the
nature of the pain. Mother had to guess what caused my screams. […] Mother
began to teach me. She closed my eyes and tapped different parts of my arms
and legs. She asked me to point to the body part that she had tapped. […] Was
any pain involved in those taps, scratches, or rubs? I do not know because I
missed those spots initially. (Mukhopadhyay 2011:209-210)
The body, being one’s own body, means that sensation is felt, not coming from some
place or object, but being inextricable from the body itself (Merleau-Ponty
2012:96). When I experience a pain, I simultaneously experience a familiarity with
my own body as a first-person perspective: as the subject of experience
encountering the pain. In the situation described by Mukhopadhyay, he does not
intuitively experience where the pain is felt and is once again left with a mental
analysis of the problem, learning step by step how to judge and analyze the location
and nature of the pain. The heart of the ambiguity then, is this: In some cases,
Mukhopadhyay experiences his body in a radically intensified manner, and in other
cases, his body as the locus of sensitivity seems to be altogether disappearing from
his field of experience.
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So far we have discussed sensation as a type of bodily self-experience, focusing
primarily on how the body presents itself as a sensing subject. However,
Mukhopadhyay also describes sense experience in a broader sense, namely as
delivering a fundamentally chaotic, unpredictable and overwhelming world. In the
following passage, Mukhopadhyay describes how playing a game of badminton
constitutes what he terms an ‘unpredictable situation’ and his bodily reaction when
he can no longer focus on the game:
It’s like a total shutdown of the senses. It is as though the eyes stop seeing and
the ears stop listening. What do I do then? I usually flap my hands to distract
my senses to a kinesthetic feel, so that my senses may be recharged. […] If
that failed, I would seek out a more predictable situation where my senses
would reconnect in a more meaningful way, so that I could connect my body
once again with the environment. (Mukhopadhyay 2011:140)
When Mukhopadhyay is no longer able to focus his attention on all the
simultaneously occurring aspects of the game (the movement of the shuttlecock
and of his own body, the perceptual surroundings, the position of the opponent etc.),
his senses ‘shatter’, making both physical and mental activity impossible to
continue. An interesting theme in this passage is that Mukhopadhyay manages to
handle this situation by ‘recharging’ his senses through flapping his hands. The
movement is described as a distraction, where his senses, instead of being burdened
with the chaotic perceptual environment, turn toward the sensation of his own body
in motion: toward a sense of bodily self. In this way, hand flapping is a way of
restoring a connection to oneself that ultimately restores the relation between the
body and its environment.
Taken together, hand flapping and the previously discussed mental maps
represent two ways of dealing with an overwhelming world: a mental one, where all
aspects of a situation is mapped out to predict the outcome of events and actions,
and a bodily one that returns the Mukhopadhyay to a feeling of oneself as a motor
subject. What world is it that needs to be made predictable, safe and familiar
through these basic strategies? Let us turn our attention more directly to how
Mukhopadhyay describes his perceptual experience.
Perceptual Experience
How do objects come to be for us? How do they come to present themselves as parts
of a world infatuated with meaning? These are some of the most crucial questions
for Merleau-Ponty in Phenomenology of Perception, and they present themselves in
a more concrete sense in the following description by Mukhopadhyay, where he
encounters an unfamiliar object:
The first thing I see is its color. If I do not get into a deeper cogitation of its
color by defining it as ‘yellow,’ and mentally lining up all the yellow things I
know of, including one of my yellow tennis balls when I was seven years old, I
move to the shape of the door. And if at all I lay my eyes on the door hinge, I
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might get distracted by the functions of levers. However, I pull my attention
from there and wonder about the function of that yellow, large rectangular
object, with levers of the first order, called a hinge. Why is that yellow, large
rectangular object with levers there? I mentally answer the question, ‘It has
allowed me to come inside that room, and can be opened or closed. And what
else can that be, other than a door.’ My labeling is complete. (Mukhopadhyay
2011:95)
What Mukhopadhyay alludes to here is when and how the object in front of him
ceases to be a collection of independent parts and details and suddenly present
themselves as a door. This happens through an effortful mental analysis of the
individual details of the door in order to finally arriving at a conclusive
identification. Merleau-Ponty describes perception as a spontaneous process, where
the individual details only appear through the whole of the object rather than
constituting it. Merleau-Ponty (2012:294) emphasizes how we, in fact, ‘‘[…] hardly
perceive any objects at all, just as we do not see the eyes of a familiar face, but
rather its gaze and its expression.’’ Stated differently, we do not normally perceive
the objective character of the things in front of us, but rather their meaning and core.
On this backdrop, Mukhopadhyay’s perception appears like a fragmented encounter
of a jumble of disintegrated details and parts, where he struggles through the process
of gathering the individual properties, struggles to make sense of it as a door. The
meaning of the object does not arrive to Mukhopadhyay intuitively and
spontaneously, as Merleau-Ponty emphasizes, but through a laborious process of
mental labelling.
It becomes increasingly apparent how Mukhopadhyay’s immersion in isolated
features of the perceptual environment substitutes the intuitive grasp of the whole of
the object or situation. Merleau-Ponty (2012:294) describes that perception of an
object always takes place on the background of a perceptual field that animates the
object with a certain sense. The perceptual field—or milieu—is not something one is
consciously aware of, but is nonetheless an implicit and taken for granted
background of meaning upon which the perception in question stands out. When
perceiving an object, we have a pre-reflective grasp on its meaning. It is this feature
of perceptual experience that Mukhopadhyay seems to be struggling with,
substituting it instead with a reflective and analytic attitude toward the object of
his experience.
Going back to the discussion of bodily self-experience, it is worth devoting some
attention to Merleau-Ponty’s (2012:212) point that ‘‘[e]very external perception is
immediately synonymous with a certain perception of my body, just as every
perception of my body is made explicit in the language of external perception.’’
Following this point, I want to suggest a continuity between Mukhopadhyay’s
bodily self-experience and the way he describes his perceptual experience as
discussed above. It was discussed how the pre-reflective bodily self-experience was
substituted with an explicit and reflective awareness of the body as an accumulation
of independent parts. This form of experience, in which a reflective and conscious
attitude is directed towards something normally taken-for-granted and only
implicitly present, was discussed also as a trait of Mukhopadhyay’s perceptual
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experience. The door did not spontaneously present itself as embedded with ‘door-
ness,’ but only made sense after an effortful analytic process. Furthermore, the same
shift in balance between pre-reflective and reflective awareness announced itself in
Mukhopadhyay’s need to map out himself and his surroundings when performing
certain actions or learning new practical skills.
According to Merleau-Ponty, the world makes sense to us intuitively and
immediately by virtue of the body being a lived unity projecting itself towards its
environment and grasping it as a field of possibilities. In this way, the body forms a
system with the world (Merleau-Ponty 2012:209) that essentially presents itself as a
relation of intimacy on the ground of which things intuitively appear meaningful as
parts of a familiar environment, much like the way one’s home presents itself in
everyday experience. When walking through my home, I do not need to think about
the location of my arm in relation to the location of the door-handle. I do not need to
plan a series of movements in order to reach for the milk in the fridge, just like I
don’t need to be careful not to bump into that table whose corner is always in the
way. This example gives a concrete sense to Merleau-Ponty’s point that we inhabit
the world. This feeling of being at home, of taken-for-granted-ness or of merely
being present in the world seems to be fragile in Mukhopadhyay’s experience and
instead characterized by a feeling of uncertainty.
In Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, bodily self-experience and perception of the
world are closely interwoven with the movements of the body and the implicit
feeling of one’s own bodily agency. Our bodily movements continuously shape the
perceptual field and the possibility of interacting with the environment constitutes a
crucial part of how the world presents itself as meaningful in our experience. The
movements of the body are an essential part of establishing the intimate relation
with the world that makes it appear intuitively meaningful. For Mukhopadhyay,
bodily movement is ultimately what ends up establishing a bodily connection with
himself and with the world. Spinning beneath the ceiling fan granted a feeling of
certainty and bodily self, just like climbing up and down the staircases secured a
stable sense of his own bodily being. Finally, flapping his hands in a stressful
situation returned his senses to his own body as the initiator of the movement; a
basic bodily self-awareness making the perceptual environment more manageable.
In this way, Mukhopadhyay’s story articulates a fragile relationship between
subject, body and world, and furthermore, how it is possible to momentarily restore
it through bodily movement.
Discussion
In order to arrive at a proper sense of what distinguishes a phenomenological
account centered on embodied subjectivity from other approaches to autism, we
need to return to the two approaches introduced in the beginning of this paper;
namely the dominant cognitive paradigm of theory of mind research and the
growing body of research in sensorimotor differences in autism. Beginning with the
former, theory of mind research is based on the idea that social understanding
requires the application of mental state concepts by way of higher-order cognitive
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abilities. The gradual maturation of the cognitive system thus marks the evolving
ability to comprehend more and more complex mental states and, based on observed
behavior, apply them successfully to others (Baron-Cohen 1995:31). The theory of
mind deficit approach to autism is based on a rapidly growing field of empirical
research demonstrating how autistic children are significantly less able to perform
the reasoning processes involved in correctly ascribing complex mental states to
other people. Accordingly, theory of mind construes autism as a local impairment in
the cognitive system responsible for understanding the perspectives of others. In the
words of prominent autism researcher, Simon Baron-Cohen (1995), autistic children
are mindblind.
In recent years, a significant amount of criticism has been directed toward theory
of mind research, both as a theoretical account of social understanding and as a
theory of autism. Ivan Leudar and Alan Costall (2009:10) emphasize that the theory
of mind paradigm in cognitive psychology invokes the basic assumptions of
psychological behaviorism by instituting a split between observable, physical
behavior as opposed to private, unobservable mental states. This point is
substantiated from within the field sensorimotor research, where Maria Brincker
and Elizabeth Torres (2013) point out that within the cognitive paradigm of autism,
cognitive abilities are construed as disembodied functions. Further, Caroline Whyatt
and Cathy Craig (2013) emphasize how cognitively driven theories of autism fail to
take into account the rich variety of bodily problems in autism related to movement
and perception.
As previously discussed, two major ambitions emerge from the sensorimotor
perspective on autism: (1) developing ways to objectively measure and quantify
human behavior and (2) to ground the scientific view of autism in the experience
and perspectives of autistic individuals. As suggested earlier, these two ambitions
are hard to reconcile. Mainly because, as we have seen, the body as it presents itself
in subjective experience cannot be measured objectively—in this way a gap
emerges between the scientific account of autism and the subjective experience of
autistic individuals. If we truly want to understand subjective experience of
sensorimotor problems in autism, we must adopt a different view on the body than
one grounded in a naturalistic frame of understanding. We must understand the
body as the basis of subjective experience rather than as an object whose properties
are available for measurement and quantification.
This is what I have demonstrated in the analysis of Mukhopadhyay’s first-person
account. I have approached an understanding of embodied subjectivity in autism by
showing how phenomena that we would classify as of a mental or psychological
nature are grounded in bodily being, and conversely, that phenomena normally
regarded as of a physical nature are embedded with a subjective sense. For instance,
the ways in which Mukhopadhyay moved his body (up and down the stairs, spinning
below the ceiling fan, or flapping his hands) should not be understood as purely
physical acts. Rather, they presented themselves with an intrinsically subjective
meaning as explications of a certain bodily self-experience and as ways to reinstate
a relation between body-subject and world. Furthermore, I have shown how mental
or cognitive phenomena (the development of mental maps or the integration of
sensory input) was infatuated with a bodily and motor sense. Following an
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important point in sensorimotor research on autism, I emphasized autistic
movement as more than an expression of cognitive or social impairment. Autistic
movement and behavior should be considered meaningful and sensible as ways of
understanding, responding and relating to the environment and oneself as an
experiencing subject. This way of understanding movement and behavior points to a
notion of the body as the locus of subjectivity, and of bodily subjectivity as an
activity in which the body-subject projects itself into the world.
A number of themes have emerged in the analysis of Mukhopadhyay’s work that
resonate well with experiences recounted in a number of different autobiographical
accounts and first-person descriptions of autism. Differences in bodily self-
experience are described in Grandin (2006), Williams (1992), Rajapatirama (in
Wallis 2006) and qualitative studies of sensory and motor differences (Robledo,
Donnellan, and Strandt-Conroy 2012). The autistic writer and poet Chandima
Rajapatirama further describes the relation between a basic sense of bodily self and
the ability to perform everyday actions which also feature prominently in
Mukhopadhyay’s account and is further described by Sue Rubin (Rubin et al.
2001) and Alberto Frugone (Biklen et al. 2005). As is also described in many
accounts by autistic individuals (see for example Nazeer 2006, Blackburn 2000 and
Davidson 2010), Mukhopadhyay uses self-stimulatory movement is a way of
tackling an overwhelming, unpredictable and chaotic world.2 Another strategy for
Mukhopadhyay is the effortful cognitive analysis of situations, which he terms
‘mapping.’ As shown in Emma Williams’ analysis (2004), a common theme in
autistic autobiography is taking a reflective and analytical attitude toward situations
that by non-autistics are usually handled intuitively and without cognitive effort.
Williams addresses the way autistic individuals handle the unpredictability and
complexity of social situations. This draws attention to an aspect of autistic
experience that does not figure very prominently in Mukhopadhyay’s account: how
sensorimotor differences may affect the experience of and engagement in social
situations. As described by Charles Hale, movement difficulties may cause
challenges with bodily expression in social situations:
[W]hen I should be smiling, sometimes I know that I am not smiling but may
be even frowning. This causes me a great deal of pain and makes me look as
though I am not comprehending when, in fact, I am crying to respond in an
appropriate manner. (Hale and Hale 1999:32)
This calls for further exploration of how a different way of experiencing the world
and oneself might affect how autistic individuals engage in social situations and
interactions. Damian Milton (2012, 2014b) emphasizes how differences between
autistic experience and non-autistic experience of sociality causes a breach in the
reciprocity and mutuality of social interaction. This creates a ‘double empathy
2 Research has traditionally depicted repetitive, stereotyped or self-stimulatory behaviors in autism from
a behaviorist perspective as something to be eliminated or treated (Boyd, McDonough, and Bodfish
2012). However, recent research emphasizes the productive and positive value of these behaviors as ways
of managing a chaotic and overwhelming environment (Sinha et al. 2014; Davidson 2010), as sources of
pleasure, social engagement between autistics or even as cultural and artistic expression (Bakan 2014;
Nolan and McBride 2015; Conn 2015).
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problem’ that is irreducible to potential impairments or cognitive deficits on the part
of the autistic person. Milton argues that social situations are jointly negotiated and
constructed, and cannot be ‘psychologized’ in the way that the dominant cognitive
paradigm in autism research would have it. Milton and other autistic academics and
self-advocates object to the view that autism is a ‘‘dysfunctional deviation from an
idealized notion of normalcy’’ (Milton 2014b:6), and to the fact that autistic voices
and experiences are often neglected in mainstream autism research:
Such views are informed by research that […] discounts the subjective
experiences of those who identify as being on the autism spectrum themselves
as worthy of rigorous academic study. (Milton 2012:884)
Including autistic people in research and knowledge production as both researchers
and co-researchers is a promising beginning toward balancing the distribution of
power in autism research. As I have argued earlier in this article, including the
experiences of autistic individuals as a basis for knowledge claims about autism
requires a framework within which to understand and conceptualize such
experience. In other words, if we are to use autistic experience as a basis for
understanding autism, we need to get serious about studying experience system-
atically and rigorously.
What phenomenology offers in this context is a conceptual and methodological
framework that studies subjective experience and embodiment in a number of
different areas highly relevant to autism research, such as perception, movement and
sociality. As a frame of understanding in psychology, phenomenology calls for an
approach to subjectivity solidly grounded in empirical investigations of first-person
experience through rigorous analysis of experiential descriptions obtained through
qualitative methodology. Reiterating Husserl’s demand that phenomenology should
remain descriptive, phenomenological psychology is aimed at staying as close to
concrete experience as possible while trying to describe the meaning with which
phenomena present themselves to the experiencing subject (Giorgi 2009:98). In his
description of what characterizes phenomenology as a method, Daniel Schmicking
(2010:41) stresses that this notion of describing phenomena as they appear in
experience is not so straightforward and simple as it may seem. Phenomenologists
are interested in the ways in which phenomena present themselves, and this is
exactly what poses the challenge, because the ways in which we experience are not
what makes up the content of the experience. Phenomenology explores the
structures that shape concrete experience, rather than what the experience is about.
In this way, the ambition in phenomenological psychology is to approach the
experiential structures presupposed by our reflective awareness of the world.
Focusing on the structures of experience made it possible to sketch out certain
continuities between the experiences described by Mukhopadhyay that might not
otherwise be easy to spot. For instance, a basic sense of uncertainty or loss of a pre-
reflective grasp of his own body and surroundings permeated a manifold of different
experiential situations. This pointed to a break in the relationship between himself
as an embodied subject and the world as a meaningful field for possible action.
Moreover, it was possible to understand different strategies to secure and anchor this
relationship between body-subject and world: a mental variant where
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Mukhopadhyay reflectively tries to make the world sensible and predictable, and a
bodily one functioning as a way of stabilizing the experience of an acting, bodily
self.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have demonstrated the relevance and potential of understanding first-
person experience in autism through the phenomenological notion of embodied
subjectivity. Developing a systematic framework for understanding subjective
experience in autism is of immense importance for several reasons. First, it allows
us ground the scientific understanding of autism in the experience of autistic
individuals, thereby avoiding theoretically driven misconceptions about autistic
behavior. Secondly, an understanding of embodied subjectivity bridges the gap
between physical and mental phenomena and shows how these apparent dualities
are interwoven and inseparable aspects of being human. Adopting a phenomeno-
logical frame of understanding requires an openness toward exploratory and
qualitatively driven research models, which stand in contrast to experimental
research paradigms where a hypothesis can be tested without exploring the
subjective experience of the research participants. Furthermore, it requires a
willingness to work with sometimes rather equivocal philosophical analyses and
notions that are hard to operationalize. I believe, however, that the meaning of
subjective experience is exactly to be found in that complexity, and that it is worth
the effort in order to begin grounding scientific knowledge about autism in the
experiences of autistic individuals themselves.
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